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## CHAPTER 5

### Values and Cultural Membership

Wayne Baker and Amaney Jamal

Arabs in Detroit take great pride in their traditions, customs, and values. The region is home to Arabs from across the Arab world, including Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Yemen, Egypt, the Gulf, and North Africa. Cultural values and traditions are a unifying force for this heterogeneous population. Consider, for example, the Dearborn Arab International Festival. Held each summer, and attracting more than 300,000 visitors, the festival embraces the area's diversity with its Arab traditions. Dance and Dabke troops, art, food from falafel and shawarma to hummus and baked delicacies, Arab music, henna booths, coffee cup readings, and Arab merchandise are a few of the ways in which Arabs share their traditions with one another. Underlying these vibrant cultural traditions are deep-rooted values. But are the values that unite the diverse Arab population also the root of divisiveness between Arab Americans and mainstream American society?

This question has been present explicitly or implicitly in private worries, public debates, and scholarly discourse about the place of Arabs and Muslims in American society, especially since 9/11. For example, as noted in chapter 1, many Americans express concerns about the compatibility of Arab Americans and other Americans, indicating less acceptance of Arab Americans than any other group, including whites, African Americans, Asians, and Hispanics (Farley, Krysan, and Couper 2006). Some scholars draw sharp symbolic boundaries,

defining recent immigrants, especially Hispanics and Muslims, as outsiders who threaten the cultural unity of the nation (Schlesinger 1991; Huntington 2004). From a citizenship perspective, these negative views imply that many Americans—and some scholars—feel that Arabs and Muslims may not be cultural citizens of society, that they may not share important values or “moral bonds” (Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann 2006) with the general population.

Cultural citizenship, as described in chapter 1, relates to the multiculturalism theme in citizenship theory, which focuses on how to reconcile diversity and differences in values among citizens with the need for national unity and a conception of belonging. Of course, symbolic boundaries that define Muslims and Arabs as other have implications for the rights theme as well. Defining members of a group as other is often used as moral justification to deny or abridge the rights of members of the group (see, for example, chapters 2 and 3). Thus, the post-9/11 era has had an impact on both the rights and multiculturalism notions of citizenship, such as the erosion of the protections of legal citizenship in the name of national security, and concerns about the compatibility of Arab as an identity with American as shared values (Lipset 1996; Baker 2005).

In this chapter, we map values and view them in cross-cultural perspective, using a unique combination of data that allows us to compare the values of Arab Americans in the Detroit region with members of the general population living in the same area, with Americans nationwide, with the peoples of four Arab nations, and with a large number of other societies.<sup>1</sup> We define what we mean by values, focusing on two dimensions of values—a continuum of traditional versus secular-rational values and a continuum of survival versus self-expression values—shown to be valid for making comparisons across cultures as well as within American society (see, for example, Inglehart and Baker 2000; Norris and Inglehart 2004; Baker 2005; Baker and Forbes 2006). As we elaborate, the first dimension taps a constellation of values about God, country, and family. Consistent with usage in previous research, we use the label *traditional* because these values are more than just strong religious values. Similarly, we use the label *secular-rational* because these values are more than the absence of strong religious beliefs; *rational* is used in the Weberian sense to indicate the “use of reason, logic, science, and means-ends calculations rather than religion or long-established customs to govern social, political, and economic life” (Baker 2005, 7). In this chapter, we use *secular* as a shorthand but always mean secular-rational. The second dimension represents a constellation of values

about security and safety, trust, tolerance, and well-being. Survival values, as we define, are at one end of this dimension. Self-expression values are at the other. We use the labels *survival* and *self-expression* to retain consistency with usage in previous research. Of course, values other than traditional-secular-rational values and survival-self-expression values are important and could be examined, but other values have not been examined as systematically around the world as these two dimensions.

After producing a cultural map showing the positions of various populations, we analyze how and why values vary along each dimension, considering the influences of U.S. citizenship, immigrant status, experiences related to 9/11, language, religion, country of origin or ancestry, education, household income, and other demographic variables. We interpret our findings by considering the unique role of values as the cultural foundation of American society (Baker 2005) and highlight some of the unique cultural tensions in American society that are intensified when crisis situations—like 9/11—are perceived to threaten the moral and political boundaries of the national community. We conclude by returning to the opening questions of this chapter, arguing that judging whether the values of Arab Americans and other Americans are close enough or too far apart depends on frame of reference—the perspective one takes (local, national, or global) and the theory of citizenship one uses (narrow assimilation or broad cultural citizenship).

## MAPPING VALUES IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE

What are values? Values are emotionally held beliefs about desirable goals; values transcend specific situations and are used as principles or standards to guide actions, to make decisions, and to evaluate people, actions, policies, and events (Schwartz 1994; Schwartz and Bardi 2001). There are, of course, many values that could be considered. Because our focus is cross-cultural, however, we study values that have been shown to be “reasonably comprehensive and universally applicable” in cross-cultural research (Rokeach 1973, 89). Only two systematic approaches to the cross-cultural study of values meet Rokeach’s criterion, and only one—the World Values Surveys—includes surveys of Arab nations.<sup>2</sup> The World Values Surveys were designed by an international team of scholars, including some from Arab or predominately Muslim countries (such as Bangladesh, Iran, Jordan, Nigeria, and Turkey), with cross-cultural comparisons in mind: “building on extensive previous cross-national survey

research and extensive pilot testing . . . it was developed to ask questions that *do* have shared meaning across many cultures” (Inglehart 1997, 91). The World Values Surveys now cover more than eighty nations, including four that are Arab—Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and Algeria (for details on the design, methodologies, and coverage of the World Values Surveys, see [www.worldvaluessurvey.org](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org).)

Early researchers analyzed data from World Values Surveys to determine the best way to compare and contrast the basic values of the peoples of diverse cultures around the globe. Their goal was to identify a valid and parsimonious set of dimensions that would reveal important similarities and differences in values across cultures. Teams of investigators in disparate regions, such as Africa, Latin America, the Nordic region, and eastern Europe, worked independently and without knowledge of one another’s findings. And yet each team discovered and replicated the same dimensions (see discussion in Inglehart 1997, 91–92). These dimensions have proved to be robust, reproduced each time a new wave of the World Values Surveys is conducted (for the latest findings, see [www.worldvaluessurvey.org](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org)). These dimensions are important because they reveal a coherent and comprehensive cultural geography of the world. We have therefore adopted the same dimensional framework for our analysis of the values of Arab Americans in cross-cultural perspective.


The first of two dimensions is a continuum of what are called traditional values versus secular values (see, for example, Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Baker 2005).<sup>3</sup> There is debate about the meaning and indicators of traditional and secular values (see Gorski 2000; Hout and Fischer 2003; Marwell and Demerath 2003). In general, the traditional-secular dimension represents a constellation of values about God, country, and family. Traditional values are indicated, for example, by strong beliefs in the importance of God, the importance of religion, frequent attendance at religious services, and a great deal of confidence in the country’s religious leaders and institutions; those who hold traditional values get comfort and strength from religion, and describe themselves as religious persons. Those with traditional values tend to have absolute rather than relative standards of morality. They believe that divorce, suicide, and euthanasia are not justifiable. Those with traditional values believe that it is more important for children to learn obedience and religious faith than independence and determination, and that one of the main goals in life is to make one’s parents proud. Those with traditional values favor more respect for authority, take protectionist attitudes

toward foreign trade, emphasize social conformity rather than individualism, and report high levels of national pride. Secular values emphasize the opposite positions on all these topics. This chapter uses a broad definition of secular, based on a set of values about religion, country, and family, whereas chapter 4 uses a narrow definition of secular that focuses on religious practices and religious identification. These definitions are different but compatible.

The second dimension is a continuum of survival values versus self-expression values—security and safety, quality of life, well-being, trust, and tolerance. Survival values are indicated, for example, by an emphasis on physical and economic safety and security above all other goals. Those with survival values tend to distrust other people in general. They feel threatened by foreigners, by ethnic diversity, and by cultural change; they are intolerant of members of outgroups. Those with survival values are not involved in politics or political participation—for example, they rarely, if ever, sign a petition. They are favorable to authoritarian government. Survival values are indicated by support of traditional gender roles and the Strict Father family model (Lakoff 1996). Those with survival values emphasize materialist values; a strong economy is more important than protecting the environment. Self-expression values emphasize the opposite positions on these topics. For example, self-expression values relate to what Fogel calls spiritual or immaterial needs, such as “the struggle for self-realization, the desire to find a deeper meaning in life than the endless accumulation of consumer durables and the pursuit of pleasure, access to the miracles of modern medicine, education not only for careers but for spiritual values, methods of financing an early, fruitful, and long-lasting retirement, and increasing the amount of quality time available for family activities” (2000, 176–77).

By putting these two dimensions together, we can draw a cultural map of the world. One such map is presented in figure 5.1. The location of each society is based on the typical values of the population on each dimension. (We use the word *typical* in the statistical sense to mean the average for all respondents in a specific population. The average indicates the central tendency in a population.) As shown, similar nations tend to cluster. For example, historically Protestant nations tend to be located in the upper-right quadrant of the map. These are among the most secular and self-expression oriented nations of all. The United States is also one of the most self-expression oriented nations, but it has unusually traditional values, more traditional than the values of the peoples of most of western Europe. The Muslim world (the Middle

Figure 5.1 Two Dimensions of Values, Arab Americans and Other Americans



Source: Authors' compilation.

East, North Africa, Central Asia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, parts of India) tends to be in the lower-left quadrant. The four Arab nations (Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and Algeria) are a tight group inside the Middle East cluster. Turkey is the most secular nation in the Middle East cluster, almost at the same position on the traditional-secular dimension as the United States. This location makes sense, given that Turkey is an officially secular society with a republican parliamentary democracy.

Other analysts have demonstrated that nations cluster in patterns based, in part, on similar levels of economic development (Inglehart and Baker 2000;

Inglehart and Norris 2003; Baker 2005). For example, the two-value dimensions are highly correlated with the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Human Development Index, as well as with other indicators of existential conditions, such as real GDP per capita, population growth, political governance, and human rights (see, for example, Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Norris and Inglehart 2004). The UNDP Human Development Index is a composite measure based on life expectancy, educational attainment, and adjusted real income. The fact that it is closely correlated with traditional-secular values and survival-self-expression values supports the argument that existential conditions influence values. For example, the nations of western Europe rate high on the Human Development Index, and those of the Middle East rate at considerably lower levels (table 5.1). Correspondingly, we see many western nations in the upper-right quadrant of the cultural map, and Middle Eastern in the lower-left quadrant (figure 5.1). This pattern suggests that differences in existential conditions are one reason why the values of the peoples of western and Middle Eastern nations are different (see also Inglehart 2007).

Of course, many other factors influence values as well, such as political relations, political power, histories of colonial domination, class inequalities, and so on. The values held by a people represent their entire historical heritage (Inglehart and Baker 2000, 31). For example, the same analyses that demonstrate the effect of level of human development on values also report that the religious and cultural heritage of a nation exerts an independent effect on values (Inglehart and Baker 2000). Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart used the term *cultural traditions axiom* to help explain the link. According to this axiom, "the distinctive worldviews that were originally linked with religious traditions have shaped the cultures of each nation in an enduring fashion; today, these distinctive values are transmitted to the citizens even if they never set foot in a church, temple, or mosque" (Norris and Inglehart 2004, 17–18). They argue that the media and educational institutions are the main agents of socialization, but we add that in nations where the large majority of people profess strong religious values—such as those of the Middle East and America (Baker 2005)—religious institutions continue to act as influential agents of socialization. Religious values are reinforced and transmitted by a nation's culture by the policies of its religious organizations and its government, and by social networks—for example, in nations where most people are religious, the "pool of potential friends, teachers, work colleagues, and marriage-partners" are similarly religious (Kelley and De Graaf 1997).

**Table 5.1** Human Development Index for Selected Nations, 2003

Western Nations	Middle Eastern Nations
1 Norway	44 Qatar
2 Iceland	46 Kuwait
3 Sweden	48 United Arab Emirates
4 Australia	73 Saudi Arabia
5 Netherlands	79 Oman
6 Belgium	83 Lebanon
7 United States	90 Jordan
8 Canada	96 Turkey
10 Switzerland	98 Occupied Palestinian Territories
11 Denmark	106 Iran
12 Ireland	107 Algeria
13 United Kingdom	110 Syria
14 Finland	120 Egypt
15 Luxembourg	126 Morocco
16 Austria	148 Yemen
17 France	
18 Germany	
19 Spain	
20 New Zealand	
21 Italy	
23 Portugal	
Average Human Development Rank = 11.7	Average Human Development Rank = 91.6

Source: United Nations Development Programme 2003.

The effect of religious-cultural heritage is evident in the global map (figure 5.1). Nations with similar heritages tend to cluster together: historically Protestant Europe, Catholic Europe, English speaking nations, Confucian, ex-Communist, Orthodox, South Asia, Middle East (including the four Arab nations), Latin America, and Africa. Of course, various other historical factors matter and compose the religious-cultural heritage of a nation (for example, see Moaddel 2005). Together, religious-cultural heritage and level of human development make up the formative experiences of peoples around the world, explaining a considerable amount of cross-cultural variation in values (Inglehart and Baker 2000).

Where are Arab Americans? As shown in figure 5.1, Arab Americans in the Detroit region (marked DAAS on the map) are located closer to the Arab world than to the general population in the Detroit region (marked DAS) or to the United States as a whole. Arab Americans have stronger traditional values than the values of black Americans and Hispanic Americans, according to our analyses (not shown here). The values of black and Hispanic Americans are considerably less traditional than the values of Arab Americans, but are more so than those of white Americans. At the other end of the traditional-secular dimension, Asian Americans have values that are considerably more secular than those of white Americans. Arab Americans also have more survival-oriented values than black Americans or Hispanic Americans, whose values in turn are more survival oriented than those of white Americans. Asian Americans are about as self-expression oriented as Americans generally.

Given that almost three-quarters of Arab Americans are immigrants, we expected that their typical values would be closer to those of their region of birth than to the general population in the Detroit region (most of whom are U.S.-born).<sup>4</sup> A large body of research shows that basic values are established in one's formative years and tend to remain stable over time, even when experiences and circumstances in later life are different. Experiences in adolescence and early adulthood make an indelible imprint on one's values, an impression that persists throughout the life course (Mannheim [1928]1952; Schuman and Scott 1989; Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Norris and Inglehart 2004; Tessler, Konold, and Reif 2004). People who come of age in times and places when and where they cannot take their safety and survival for granted—because, for example, of poverty, economic depression, political turmoil, repression, natural disasters, war, or terrorism—will have fundamentally different values from those who could take safety and survival for granted. Accordingly, the typical values of Arab Americans should be expected to be more traditional and more survival oriented than those of other Americans.

## VARIATIONS IN VALUES

So far we have considered the central tendencies of a nation or population. Of course, not everyone in the same population has the same values; there is always some variation. We now shift to analyze this variation within a population, examining how and why Arab Americans vary along each of the two dimensions

of values. For purposes of comparison, we conduct a similar analysis for members of the general population. Our use of the cultural maps allowed us to make comparisons considering the two dimensions together, but we now analyze each dimension separately.

We consider three groups of characteristics or experiences that may be related to variations in values. The first group includes markers or indicators of cultural membership—legal citizenship, place of birth (United States versus other), language (English or Arabic), religion (Christian or Muslim), and residence (inside or outside the Dearborn and Dearborn Heights enclave). The second group includes experiences after 9/11, positive and negative, and harassment or discrimination experienced by a person or a person's family during the two years after 9/11. The third group includes various sociodemographic variables, such as age, education, household income, race, gender, marital status, and country of birth or ancestry. Table 5.2 provides statistical results comparing Arab Americans and the general population; table 5.3 presents statistical results for immigrant Arab Americans.

**Table 5.2 Statistical Results, Arab Americans and General Public**

Independent Variables	Arab Americans (DAAS)		General Population (DAS)	
	Traditional-Secular Values	Survival-Self-Expression Values	Traditional-Secular Values	Survival-Self-Expression Values
<b>Cultural membership</b>				
U.S. citizenship	-.060 (.066)	.171* (.079)	—	—
U.S.-born	.067 (.067)	.444*** (.126)	.334* (.127)	.446** (.122)
Language (English)	-.010 (.063)	.206** (.075)	—	—
Religion (Christian)	-.023 (.080)	.132* (.067)	-.306** (.095)	-.020 (.083)
Residence (outside enclave, DAAS; outside Detroit, DAS)	.061 (.072)	-.120 (.068)	.062 (.099)	.255* (.075)

**Table 5.2 (continued)**

Independent Variables	Arab Americans (DAAS)		General Population (DAS)	
	Traditional-Secular Values	Survival-Self-Expression Values	Traditional-Secular Values	Survival-Self-Expression Values
<b>Experiences related to 9/11</b>				
Bad experience	-.021 (.069)	-.157* (.064)	—	—
Received support	-.034 (.044)	.253*** (.057)	—	—
<b>Harassment in last two years</b>				
Type 1 (verbal insults, threatening gestures)	.097 (.069)	-.195** (.065)	.008 (.085)	-.005 (.092)
Type 2 (vandalism, loss of employment, physical attack).	.211* (.096)	.050 (.090)	-.242 (.118)	-.179 (.120)
<b>Sociodemographics</b>				
Education	.084*** (.023)	.042 (.023)	.117*** (.031)	-.004 (.037)
Household income	.003 (.031)	.104*** (.032)	.013 (.048)	.165** (.048)
Working now	-.018 (.050)	.101 (.071)	.141 (.098)	.160 (.074)
Youth (18 to 25)	-.027 (.083)	-.052 (.089)	.362* (.144)	-.256 (.116)
Middle age (26 to 54)	.176** (.061)	-.133 (.095)	.084 (.080)	-.066 (.087)
Gender (male)	-.022 (.042)	-.003 (.053)	.200* (.077)	-.199* (.074)
Race (white)	-.142** (.048)	.052 (.063)	.187 (.131)	.275* (.098)

(Table continues on p.146.)

Table 5.2 (continued)

Independent Variables	Arab Americans (DAAS)		General Population (DAS)	
	Traditional-Secular Values	Survival-Self-Expression Values	Traditional-Secular Values	Survival-Self-Expression Values
Marital status (married)	-.184* (.075)	.058 (.081)	-.090 (.082)	.143 (.084)
Birth or ancestry				
Lebanon-Syria	.048 (.075)	.130* (.085)	—	—
Palestine-Jordan	.013 (.080)	.144 (.089)	—	—
Other country	-.019 (.092)	.203* (.082)	—	—
Constant	-.898** (.174)	-.536*** (.155)	-1.095*** (.210)	.082 (.167)
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.090	.301	.168	.209
N of observations	1016	1016	508	508

Source: Authors' compilation.

Notes: U.S. citizenship is a dummy variable, 1 = U.S. citizen, 0 = not citizen (DAAS only). Because 96 percent of the general population are U.S. citizens, this variable is not included in the analysis for the DAS.

Language is a dummy variable, indicating the language of the interview, 1 = English, 0 = Arabic. This variable is not applicable to the DAS because all interviews were in English.

Gender is a dummy variable, 1 = male, 0 = female.

Religion is a dummy variable. For DAS, Christian = 1, 0 = other. For DAAS, 1 = Christian, 0 = Muslim.

Residence is a dummy variable. For DAS, 1 = other, 0 = Detroit. For DAAS, 1 = outside enclave, 0 = Dearborn-Dearborn Heights (enclave).

Omitted category for country of birth-ancestry is Iraq. Comparable questions were not asked in the DAS.

Race is a dummy variable. For DAS, 1 = non-black, 0 = black. For DAAS, 1 = white, 0 = non-white.

Total sample size for 2003 Detroit Area Study = 508. Total sample size of DAAS = 1016. These results reflect adjustments for complex design features, sampling weights, and imputation of missing data.

Parentheses contain standard errors.

\*\*\*  $p < .001$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*  $p < .05$ .

Table 5.3 Statistical Results, Immigrant Arab Americans

Independent Variables	Immigrant Arab Americans		Immigrant Arab Americans (with Length of Stay Included)	
	Traditional-Secular Values	Survival-Self-Expression Values	Traditional-Secular Values	Survival-Self-Expression Values
Cultural Membership				
U.S. citizenship	-.063 (.065)	.201* (.088)	-.089 (.108)	.145 (.141)
Language (English)	-.007 (.068)	.212** (.075)	-.015 (.079)	.192* (.096)
Religion (Christian)	-.040 (.067)	.085 (.079)	-.047 (.072)	.070 (.070)
Residence (outside enclave, DAAS; outside Detroit, DAS)	.077 (.079)	.082 (.080)	.075 (.078)	.078 (.079)
Experiences related to 9/11				
Bad experience	.005 (.081)	-.262** (.064)	.006 (.081)	-.261** (.083)
Received support	-.065 (.058)	.249*** (.074)	-.068 (.056)	.242*** (.072)
Harassment in last two years				
Type 1 (verbal insults, threatening gestures)	.103 (.077)	-.115 (.078)	.103 (.077)	-.115 (.078)
Type 2 (vandalism, loss of employment, physical attack)	.170 (.101)	.001 (.090)	.169 (.101)	-.002 (.090)

(Table continues on p.148.)

Table 5.3 (continued)

Independent Variables	Immigrant Arab Americans		Immigrant Arab Americans (with Length of Stay Included)	
	Traditional-Secular Values	Survival-Self-Expression Values	Traditional-Secular Values	Survival-Self-Expression Values
<b>Sociodemographics</b>				
Education	.085*** (.024)	.033 (.027)	.087*** (.025)	.037 (.027)
Household income	-.003 (.031)	.110*** (.034)	-.005 (.033)	.104** (.038)
Working now	-.052 (.050)	.112 (.081)	-.052 (.049)	.112 (.080)
Youth	-.004 (.100)	.030 (.140)	.021 (.092)	.085 (.168)
Middle age	.150** (.055)	-.111 (.108)	.161* (.073)	-.086 (.136)
Gender (male)	-.026 (.047)	-.017 (.055)	-.026 (.047)	-.010 (.057)
Race (white)	-.099 (.056)	.058 (.064)	.100 (.057)	.053 (.067)
Marital status (married)	-.195** (.076)	.047 (.112)	-.192** (.068)	.056 (.103)
Lebanon-Syria birth	.063 (.080)	.095 (.086)	.059 (.083)	.086 (.081)
Palestine-Jordan birth	-.041 (.084)	.173 (.092)	-.050 (.087)	.153 (.079)
Other country birth	-.141* (.066)	.269*** (.080)	-.147* (.071)	.257*** (.073)
Length of stay in United States	—	—	.018 (.048)	.042 (.071)
Constant	-.840*** (.139)	-.596*** (.155)	-.887*** (.130)	-.704*** (.181)

Table 5.3 (continued)

Independent Variables	Immigrant Arab Americans		Immigrant Arab Americans (with Length of Stay Included)	
	Traditional-Secular Values	Survival-Self-Expression Values	Traditional-Secular Values	Survival-Self-Expression Values
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.092	.212	.093	.214
N of observations	737	737	737	737

Source: Authors' compilation.

Notes: U.S. citizenship is a dummy variable, 1 = U.S. citizen, 0 = not citizen.

Language is a dummy variable, indicating the language of the interview, 1 = English, 0 = Arabic.

Gender is a dummy variable, 1 = male, 0 = female.

Religion is a dummy variable, 1 = Christian, 0 = Muslim.

Residence is a dummy variable, 1 = outside enclave, 0 = Dearborn-Dearborn Heights (enclave).

Length of stay is a single discrete variable representing five cohorts of immigration. No alternative measure of length of stay is significantly associated with the dependent variables.

Omitted category for country of birth-ancestry is Iraq.

Race is a dummy variable, 1 = white, 0 = nonwhite.

Total sample size for size of DAAS = 1016, 73 percent of which are immigrants.

These results reflect adjustments for complex design features, sampling weights, and imputation of missing data.

Parentheses contain standard errors.

\*\*\*  $p < .001$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*  $p < .05$ .

### Cultural Membership

Legal citizenship provides certain rights and protections. Legal citizenship is also a symbol of commitment to American values—an indicator that the citizen considers herself or himself to be inside the moral boundaries of the nation. However, the rights of Arab Americans as U.S. citizens are under assault in the post-9/11 era, and their cultural membership has been called into question. Nonetheless, we would expect that Arab Americans who are U.S. citizens feel safer and more secure than those who are not. If they do, we should see a difference between the survival-self-expression values of Arab Americans who are U.S. citizens and those who are not. We do. The values of Arab Americans who are U.S. citizens are more self-expression oriented (less survival oriented) than the values of those who are not citizens, controlling for




other factors. The effect of U.S. citizenship remains significant even when we restrict our analysis to immigrant Arab Americans. However, when we add length of stay to the analysis for immigrants, the effect becomes insignificant. It appears, therefore, that citizenship in the narrow, legal sense makes Arab Americans feel safer and more secure, even though the legal rights of Arab Americans as U.S. citizens are under assault in the post-9/11 era. But once we control for length of stay, U.S. citizenship does not make immigrants feel safer or more secure than those who are not citizens. U.S. citizenship does not have a significant effect on traditional-secular values for Arab Americans: those who are U.S. citizens and those who are not have equally strong traditional values.

Place of birth—United States versus elsewhere—should have an effect on values similar to the effect of U.S. citizenship. Generally, U.S.-born Arab Americans experience greater economic prosperity and security; their educational experiences, facility in English, and contact with other Americans expose them to the nation's dominant religious-cultural heritage (Ajrouch 2004; Sulciman 1999). Therefore, we expect that the values of U.S.-born and foreign-born Arab Americans to be different, controlling for other factors. We find that Arab Americans born in the United States are significantly more self-expression oriented (less survival oriented) than those born in the Middle East. Place of birth has the same effect in the general population: those born outside the United States are more survival oriented. However, the values of U.S.-born Arab Americans are as traditional as those of the foreign-born. In contrast, in the general population, those born in the United States are more secular than immigrants. The different effects of place of birth on the values of these two populations are shown graphically in figure 5.2.<sup>5</sup>

Surprisingly, length of stay—how long an immigrant has been in the United States—does not influence values. We tried four formulations of length of stay to make sure this finding was correct. First, we included a simple count of the number of years. Second, we used a set of variables corresponding to three cohorts of immigration: before 1970, capturing two waves of immigration that began in the late 1800s; from 1970 to 1989, a period of continued immigration from the Arab world, with a significant percentage from Lebanon due to the Lebanese civil war; and from 1990 to 2003, immigrants from across the Middle East, including significant numbers of Iraqi Shi'a displaced after the 1991 Gulf War. Third, we used a series of variables representing five cohorts of immigration: 1996 to 2003, 1990 to 1995, 1980 to 1989, 1970 to 1979, and before 1970. Fourth, we used a simple variable represent-

Figure 5.2 Effects of Place of Birth




Source: Authors' compilation.

ing five cohorts of immigration. None of these had a significant effect on traditional-secular values or survival-self-expression values.

Language is both a marker of cultural membership and a tool for negotiating the social, economic, and political environment. Arab Americans whose preferred or only language is Arabic (Arabic speakers) may be stigmatized by the general population, compared to those whose preferred or only language is English (English speakers). Arabic speakers would be shielded from the cultural influence of mainstream American society and less able to negotiate the wider environment, which, in the post-9/11 era, would be a source of insecurity. Accordingly, we find Arab Americans who speak Arabic as their only or preferred language are more survival oriented and less self-expression oriented than those who speak English as their only or preferred language. This significant effect is virtually the same for all Arab Americans and for Arab immigrants. However, language is not associated with traditional-secular values: English and Arabic speakers have similar traditional values.

A common stereotype is that the values of Muslims and Christians are somehow different. We find, however, that Arab Muslims and Arab Christians have similar traditional values. This similarity holds for all Arab Americans and for Arab immigrants. In contrast, the values of Christians in the general

Figure 5.3 Effects on Religion



Source: Authors' compilation.

Note: Line for DAAS shows Arab Christians versus Arab Muslims.

population are considerably more traditional than the values of non-Christians. This means that the traditional values of Christians in the general population are closer to the traditional values of Arab Muslims and Arab Christians than they are to non-Christians in the general population. This similarity is shown in figure 5.3. However, religious differences in the Arab American population are associated with differences on the survival-self-expression values dimension: Arab Christians are somewhat more self-expression oriented and less survival oriented than Arab Muslims. This difference makes sense, given that Muslims are the focus of suspicion, surveillance, and investigation (see, for example, chapter 2, this volume). Surprisingly, this difference between Muslims and Christians disappears when we restrict our analysis to Arab immigrants. The values of immigrant Arab Muslims and Christians do not differ on the survival-self-expression dimension; nor do they differ on the traditional-secular dimension.

We expected that those living in the Dearborn-*Dearborn Heights* enclave would have different values than those living outside of it. This enclave is both an immigrant enclave and an ethnic community, according to John Logan, Richard Alba, and Wenquan Zhang's typology of segregated neighborhoods (2002). As an immigrant enclave, it is a destination for relatively

poor Muslim immigrants whose values and social capital are closely bound to their ethnic-religious immigrant community (see also chapter 6, this volume, on social capital). As an ethnic community, it "is grounded in motives associated more with taste and preference than with economic necessity, or even with ambitions to create neighborhoods that will symbolize and sustain ethnic identity" (Logan, Alba, and Zhang 2002, 300). However, we found that place of residence is not associated with differences in the values of Arab Americans on either dimension. The values of those who live outside the enclave are as traditional and as survival oriented as the values of those who live inside it. In the general population, place of residence does make a difference: the values of those who live outside the city of Detroit are less survival oriented (more self-expression oriented) than those of city residents.

In sum, four of five indicators of cultural membership—U.S. citizenship, place of birth, language, and religion—are significantly related to survival-self-expression values for all Arab Americans. U.S. citizenship and language are significantly related to this dimension for Arab immigrants. The Arab Americans who are closest to other Americans on this dimension—that is, more self-expression oriented—have characteristics that match those of mainstream American society: U.S. citizens, born in the United States, who speak English and are Christian. Those who are furthest from mainstream society on this dimension are not U.S. citizens, are foreign-born, are Arabic speakers, and are Muslim. Of all the indicators, place of birth and language have the biggest effects on survival-self-expression values. Not one of the indicators of cultural membership has an effect on traditional-secular values.

### Experiences After 9/11

Once formed, values tend to be stable over time. For example, a large body of research shows that values are more stable and less subject to occasional events than attitudes, such as prejudice, or emotions or moods, such as depression. Nonetheless, major historical events can impact values, even if they tend to be stable. One of these is 9/11. The 9/11 backlash was less severe in the Detroit area than elsewhere (see chapter 2, this volume), but 15 percent of Arab Americans reported having a bad personal experience after 9/11. These experiences involved negative interactions with members of the general population, such as verbal threats, public rudeness, insults, refusal of service, workplace intimidation or discrimination, assault, and so on. About 25 percent reported that, in the two years after 9/11, they or someone in their household had experienced

one or more acts of harassment and discrimination due to race, religion, or ethnicity. What we call Type 1 harassment includes verbal insults or abuse and threatening words or gestures. Type 2 harassment includes physical attack, vandalism or destruction of property, or loss of employment. We also asked in our survey about positive experiences between Arab Americans and the general population after 9/11. We found that a third of Arab Americans reported receiving expressions of support and solidarity from people who were not from Middle Eastern descent.

Negative experiences shake one's perception of security and safety; positive experiences strengthen it. Therefore, we expect that Arab Americans who personally had a bad experience after 9/11, or whose families suffered harassment or discrimination, would exhibit more survival oriented values than those of Arab Americans who did not have similar experiences. In contrast, Arab Americans who received expressions of solidarity and support should report more self-expression-oriented values. Our findings are consistent with these expectations.<sup>6</sup> The values of Arab Americans who had a negative experience after 9/11 are more survival oriented and less self-expression oriented than those who did not. The values of Arab Americans are even more survival oriented if they or anyone in their households experienced Type 1 harassment or discrimination during the past two years. Among Arab immigrants, a negative experience after 9/11 also yields values that are more survival oriented, though Type 1 harassment does not affect survival-self-expression values. Type 2 harassment is not associated with differences in survival-self-expression values for all Arab Americans or Arab immigrants. Neither Type 1 nor Type 2 affects values in the general population. The values of Arab Americans who had a positive interaction with the general population—an expression of solidarity and support after 9/11—are more self-expression oriented and less survival oriented than the values of those who did not. The same is true for Arab immigrants.

The sizable effect of experiences after 9/11 on the values of Arab Americans indicates the magnitude of this event and its aftermath. The general population's reactions to this event were transmitted through positive and negative interactions with Arab Americans, making measurable impressions on their values. Positive experiences shifted orientations toward self-expression values, an indication that these contacts made Arab Americans feel safer, more secure, more trusting, and more tolerant; negative experiences shifted orientations in the opposite direction.

### **Sociodemographic Factors**

Socioeconomic status can influence values because it reflects existential security (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Norris and Inglehart 2004). Education, for example, reflects experiences during the formative years (more economically secure families provide more formal education for their children) as well as current prosperity (more education often translates into better, higher paying jobs) (Inglehart 1997, 151–56). We therefore expect that higher socioeconomic status, indicated by level of formal education, household income, and employment, is associated with secular values and self-expression values. As expected, higher levels of education are related to secular values and lower levels to traditional values for all Arab Americans, for Arab immigrants, and for the general population. However, education is not associated with survival-self-expression values. As expected, household income is positively associated with survival-self-expression values for all Arab Americans, Arab immigrants, and the general population but it is not associated with traditional-secular values. Working now is not associated with either dimension of values.

These findings suggest a simple pattern: higher education tends to produce secular values, and higher household income tends to produce self-expression values. This pattern is the same in both populations, but still there are notable differences between Arab Americans and the general population. For example, our analyses show that higher education is associated with secular values in both populations, but the values of Arab Americans with the most education (graduate or professional degree) are about as traditional as those of the general population with the least education (less than high school). Higher income is associated with self-expression values in both populations, but the values of Arab Americans with the highest household incomes (\$100,000 or more) are still more survival oriented than those of the general population with the lowest household incomes (less than \$20,000).

Values vary by age when the formative experiences of the young are different than those of the old (Inglehart and Baker 2000). For example, 9/11 and its aftermath are notable formative experiences for all young Americans, but these experiences may have been especially traumatic for young Arab Americans, those who were between eighteen and twenty-five years old at the time of our survey in 2003. These events were traumatic experiences for older Americans, too, but would have been assimilated into a mental framework that was already well established in earlier years. Of course it is possible that 9/11 and its aftermath

were so traumatic that these events had a similar impact on people of all ages. Surprisingly, the values of the youngest age cohort of Arab Americans—those who experienced the events of 9/11 in their formative period—are not significantly different from the values of the oldest cohort (age fifty-five and older). We do find, however, that the values of the middle cohort (age twenty-six to fifty-four) are significantly more secular than the values of the oldest cohort; this is true for all Arab Americans as well as for Arab immigrants. One reason may be that the middle cohort has had substantial contact with mainstream society in ways that secularize their values. Further, the middle-age cohort is most likely the cohort to have been influenced by the wave of national secularism in the Arab world from the 1960s to the 1970s. Age, however, does not influence survival–self-expression values.

Gender does not have a significant effect on values in the Arab American population. In the general population, however, the values of men are more secular and more survival oriented than those of women. Arab Americans who classify their race as white have more secular values than those who do not, though race does not influence survival–self-expression values. We see a different pattern in the general population: those who classify their race as white are more self-expression oriented, though race does not influence traditional–secular values. Married Arab Americans have more traditional values than those who are not married. Marital status does not influence values in the general population.

Finally, we consider how values may be influenced by the formative experiences of national origin and ancestry. We analyzed the effects of the three largest groups living in the Detroit region, plus a residual category: Lebanon-Syria, Palestine-Jordan, Iraq, and other nations. We used Iraq as the comparison group. The values of Lebanese and Syrian Arab Americans are more self-expression oriented than those of Iraqis, though this is true only when we consider U.S.-born and foreign-born Arab Americans together. Iraqi immigrants are more survival oriented and more secular than Arab immigrants from nations not included in our largest groups. The values of Palestinian and Jordanian Arab Americans are not significantly different from those of Iraqi Arab Americans.

## INTERPRETING VALUES IN THE AMERICAN CONTEXT

The preceding analysis yields statistical facts about the values of Arab Americans. What do the facts mean? Facts do not speak for themselves; they must be interpreted. This is so even in the physical realm. For example, astronomers can agree

on the facts of celestial observations but disagree about what they mean and why they occur (Kuhn 1957; Baker 2005, 125). In the cultural realm, there is even more room for interpretation. To interpret the statistical facts about the values of Arab Americans, we need to consider the role of values in American society and some of the cultural tensions that are intensified when crisis situations—such as 9/11—threaten the moral and political boundaries of the national community.

The contemporary focus on Arab Americans is only a recent instance of debates about values and cultural citizenship that have persisted throughout American history. Even before the nation's founding, the peoples who migrated to what became America debated questions of cultural membership, erected and contested symbolic boundaries between groups, and on occasion clashed violently because of differences in values, among other reasons (Fischer 1989). Since then, American history has been punctuated repeatedly by clashes of values (Baker 2005). The specific events, conditions, or social problems that trigger these clashes are too many and too diverse to revisit here (but see Baker 2005, 112–30). The point is that concerns about the compatibility of Arab American values with mainstream values are a contemporary case of concerns that echo throughout American history about the compatibility of different groups and American society.

Why is this so? The source of clashes of values is rooted deep in American society. Many observers have noted that America is unusual, deviant, exceptional—qualitatively different from other Western societies (de Tocqueville 1988; Kingdon 1999). These qualitative differences are sometimes called American exceptionalism. The location of the United States on the cultural map (figure 5.1) vividly illustrates American exceptionalism. For example, the nation has unusually traditional values, compared to other economically developed democracies. Americans are more religious, moralistic, absolutist, and patriotic than the peoples of virtually all other economically advanced democracies. These traditional values are widely shared and stable over time (Baker 2005). However, America has strong self-expression values that have become even stronger over time. Over time, America is moving horizontally across the cultural map (figure 5.1) and most other economically advanced democracies are moving upward and to the right, becoming more secular and more self-expression oriented (Baker 2005; Inglehart and Baker 2000). The combination of stable traditional values and increasingly strong self-expression values means that America is a “mixed system” of values (Baker 2005, 161). This mixed system “contains cultural contradictions because its prevailing principles provide

contrary guides to conduct" (Baker 2005, 161). On the one hand, traditional values demand obedience to an absolute and external moral authority—God, country, and family—and strict conformity to mainstream traditional American values. On the other hand, self-expression values demand obedience to oneself as the source of moral authority and promote tolerance, understanding, and acceptance of difference. Differences in values are accepted and even celebrated.

Real or perceived differences in values can be viewed as threats to the cultural integrity of the nation (Baker 2005). This is one reason that strict assimilation has been the traditional American response to difference—immigrants who bring different values to America are not threats if they melt into the dominant American culture (see chapter 1, this volume). America's mixed system means that strict assimilation (conformity to American values) and broad cultural citizenship (acceptance of diversity) are jostling strands in American culture. One may have prominence over the other, but both are always present. When crisis situations threaten the imagined community, America's traditional values gain prominence and responses to difference swing toward strict assimilation. This reaction was prominent after 9/11, for example, and continues today. When crisis situations subside, America's self-expression values gain prominence and responses to difference swing toward broad cultural citizenship. The events of 9/11 crossed America's physical boundaries and threatened its ideology. Responses included the backlash against Arab and Muslim Americans and foreign military actions that took on the character of moral crusades. Tolerance, understanding, and acceptance of difference were not lost, which is one reason why the backlash in the Detroit region was less severe than elsewhere (see chapter 2, this volume). But the dominant, lasting reaction to 9/11 has been concern about the compatibility of Arab Americans and American society.

## CONCLUSION


We have documented that the typical values of Arab Americans living in the Detroit region are closer to the Arab world—strong traditional values coupled with strong survival values—than to those of the general population in the Detroit region or of Americans nationwide. Arab Americans have stronger traditional values, and more survival oriented values, than black Americans and Hispanic Americans. Moreover, the traditional values of Arab Americans do not vary by legal citizenship, place of birth, language, religion,

or residence. Taken together, these findings indicate that Arab Americans maintain a distinctive traditional culture—one that is different from mainstream American culture.

An irony is that the traditional values of Arab Americans are not that far from the traditional values of other Americans, once we view values in global perspective. Consider, for example, that the values of almost all European nations (another major destination for Arabs and Muslims) are quite secular, and the gap between their secular values and the traditional values of Arabs and Muslims is wider there than it is in the United States. These differences can be seen in the global map (figure 5.1) and are particularly striking when we compare the locations of various European nations, Middle Eastern nations, Arab Americans, and the American general population on two components of the traditional-secular scale—importance of God and justifiability of abortion (figure 5.4). Not only are Arab Americans closer to other Americans than to most European nations, Americans in general are closer to Arab Americans and the Middle East than they are to the peoples of all historically Protestant European nations.

Judging whether the values of Arab Americans and other Americans are close enough or too far apart is an exercise of interpretation. It depends on frame of reference—the perspective one takes and the theory of citizenship one uses. From the local perspective of the Detroit region or from the national American perspective, the values of Arab Americans and other Americans appear to be far apart; in global perspective, however, their values are closer to one another than to many economically affluent democracies. From a strict assimilationist theory of citizenship, the gap between the values of Arab Americans and other Americans may be too wide to consider Arab Americans as cultural members of mainstream society. Using a broad theory of cultural citizenship, however, Arab Americans foreshadow a possible future of citizenship in the postnation era, where shared collective identity is formed through accommodation rather than suppression of ethnic identities (Kymlicka 1995), where a minority group believes in and participates in democratic institutions, yet exercises the universal right to one's own culture (Soysal 1997) and preserves its own social space in mainstream society (Rosaldo 1997). Because 9/11 and its aftermath continue to threaten the moral and political boundaries of the national community, it is more likely that the differences between Arab Americans and other Americans will continue to be interpreted from a strict assimilationist frame of reference.

Figure 5.4 Comparisons on Justifiability of Abortion and Importance of God



Source: Authors' compilation.

Notes: Ten-point response scale for justifiability of abortion, where 1 = can never be justified and 10 = can always be justified. Ten-point response scale for importance of God, where 1 = not at all important and 10 = very important.

Each dot represents the average scores for a given population.

Diagonal line represents best linear fit between two items (correlation = .900).

## NOTES

- Specifically, we combine data from the 2003 Detroit Arab American Study (DAAS); the 2003 Detroit Area Study (DAS), a survey of the general population living in the same region; and the World Values Surveys (WVS), the largest systematic attempts ever made to document values, attitudes, and beliefs around the world,

1. The other approach, developed mainly by a psychologist, examines ten values: universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, security, power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction (Schwartz 1994; Schwartz and Bardl 2001). These have been applied in surveys in more than fifty nations, but mostly the samples have been of specific categories of people (such as teachers or students), not representative national surveys. More important, the values have not been surveyed in Arab nations.

2. These two dimensions are the first and second factors, respectively, from a factor analysis of ten items. The following five items load primarily on the first factor: the importance of God in the respondent's life, justifiability of abortion, autonomy index (qualities that children should learn at home—obedience and religious faith versus independence and determination), respect for authority, and national pride (patriotism). The following five items load primarily on the second dimension: subjective well-being (self-reported happiness), interpersonal trust, justifiability of homosexuality, priority of economic and physical security versus self-expression and quality of life (called the Materialism Index), and political participation (signing a petition). These ten items are correlated in sensible ways with dozens of other survey items (for further details on these dimensions and their statistical underpinnings, see Inglehart and Baker 2000; Baker 2005; factor loadings are available at [www.detroitarabamericanstudy.org](http://www.detroitarabamericanstudy.org)).

3. The values of Arab Americans and the general population are statistically different on both value dimensions, as well as on eight of the ten items that make up the traditional-secular and survival-self-expression dimensions. The largest differences, where Arab Americans have stronger traditional values than the general population, are justifiability of abortion, justifiability of homosexuality, and the belief that religious faith and obedience are more important for children to learn than independence and self-determination. The largest differences on the other scale, where Arab Americans have stronger survival values, are trust and political participation (signing a petition). This analysis, not shown here, is available at [www.detroitarabamericanstudy.org](http://www.detroitarabamericanstudy.org).

4. Figure 5.2 and related figures show the predicted values on the traditional-secular-rational scale and survival-self-expression scale, using the regression equations in table 5.2, when the independent variable under consideration, such as place of birth, is at its minimum and maximum. For place of birth, the minimum value = 0 (born outside the United States) and the maximum value = 1 (born in the United States). The average values of all other independent variables in the

equations are used. Each figure displays the results (predicted values) of eight regression equations (minimum and maximum values of the independent variable under consideration X two values scales X two populations). To conserve space, only the bottom half of the map is shown.

6. We did not expect experiences after 9/11 to be related to traditional-secular values. To our surprise, Type 2 harassment is significantly associated with traditional-secular values for all Arab Americans; those who experienced Type 2 have more secular values than those who did not (table 5.2). Because this effect is not significant for Arab immigrants (table 5.3), we suggest a reverse explanation. Instead of Type 2 experiences "causing" more secular values, those with more secular values—who would be more assimilated in the larger society—are more likely to live and work with non-Arabs and thus more likely to have Type 2 experiences.
7. The values of the youngest age cohort in the general population are significantly more secular than the oldest age cohort (table 5.2), suggesting that factors other than 9/11 had more influence on the values of the young.

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## CHAPTER 6

### Local and Global Social Capital

Wayne Baker, Amaney Jamal, and Mark Tessler

The aspirations of many Arab Americans in the post-9/11 era reflect the tensions inherent in the meaning of citizenship in a diverse society (chapter 1, this volume). Consider, for example, a common theme that emerged from answers to an open-ended question in our survey about the most pressing needs facing the community: to keep Arab culture alive in America and to strengthen Arab cultural institutions. But another common theme was the call for more unity between Arabs and non-Arabs in the Detroit region and an urging for Arab Americans to accept American culture, assimilate, or at least to be open to life in mainstream American society (Baker et al. 2004, 22). Each side of this tension has different implications for *social capital*, "social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them" (Putnam 2000, 19; see also Coleman 1988, 1990). On one side, maintaining distinct identities and cultural institutions calls for *bonding* social capital—exclusive networks that reinforce identity and maintain homogenous groups (Putnam 2000, 22). On the other, more unity between Arabs and non-Arabs and integration in mainstream society calls for *bridging* social capital—inclusive networks that are "outward looking and encompass people across diverse social cleavages" (Putnam 2000, 22).

Bonding and bridging social capital are not mutually exclusive (Putnam 2007). Usually, there is a mix of both forms and the mix itself can change